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publicly funded services, it is somewhat surprising that many social scientists have preferred
to explain government outsourcing by the pursuit of economic efficiency. Starting out from
different theories, we investigate political explanations of government outsourcing using a
Swedish data set in which outsourcing varies between municipalities and over time, as well as
between services. Our identification strategy focuses on two services with similar contracting
problems and local market conditions: preschools and primary schools. We study a period in
which Swedish municipalities had full discretion in the provision of preschools, while their
influence on the private provision of primary education was limited by a national voucher
system. The comparison of preschools with primary schools in a difference-in-differences
model suggests that the political color of the ruling majority influences outsourcing, which is
consistent with the Citizen Candidate model of representative democracy.
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Education1. Introduction
The last 30 years have witnessed an intensive, ideologically charged debate over the use of private contractors for publicly
funded services such as education and health care. With this in mind, it is somewhat surprising that many social scientists have
preferred to explain government outsourcing by the pursuit of economic efficiency. Building on Coase (1937), Williamson (1981,
1985) and Grossman and Hart (1986), the Transaction Cost model of Hart et al. (1997) explains outsourcing by the contracting
difficulties of different services. The difficulty of contracting, in turn, depends on the difficulty ofmeasuring andmonitoring quality,
the need for flexibility, and the risk that “specific assets” give rise to hold-up problems.1 An implicit assumption is that policy
makers maximize social welfare; political parties, ideology, and the self-interest of voters and politicians do not matter.
Other models of government outsourcing or of policymaking in general have more of a political flavor. The political models
assume that politicians are motivated either by the desire to implement their preferred policy or by the rents that come with
holding office. The Citizen Candidate model of Besley and Coate (1997) and Osborne and Slivinski (1996) has policy motivated
politicians. Office motivated politicians are found in the Patronage model of government outsourcing (Lopez-de-Silanes et al.,
1997) and in the Downsian model of electoral competition (Downs, 1957).
In the Citizen Candidate model, politicians are motivated to run for office by the prospect of implementing their own preferred
policy. Policies are expected to diverge such that outsourcing – like other political choices – depends on the identity of the
winning side in elections. The prediction is that right majorities will use outsourcing to a larger extent than left majorities.: +46 8 665 45 99.
theoretical account of the Transaction Cost model.
-NC-ND license.
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including support from public employee unions, and the ability to use local government employees on political projects, as well as
the ability to control unemployment and to hire relatives (Lopez-de-Silanes et al., 1997). The cost of patronage is that it has to be
paid for by higher taxes, which is something voters generally dislike. The Patronage model predicts that politicians will choose
lower levels of outsourcing than voters prefer, but that this difference will be smaller in competitive elections as politicians then
need to accommodate voter preferences in order to be reelected.2 The model does not, however, predict any difference between
political parties to the left and to the right.
As is well known, the Downsian model predicts policy convergence even if the competing politicians prefer different policies.
The policy outcome is determined by the preferences of the median voter. The use of outsourcing is thus predicted to depend on
the preferences of the voters and not on the political color of the ruling majority.
The Citizen Candidate model is thus the only one of the four described models in which the political color of the ruling
majority influences outsourcing; right majorities are predicted to opt for higher levels of outsourcing than left majorities. The four
models also differ with respect to the influence of voter preferences on outsourcing. Preferences for the right give rise to more
outsourcing in the Citizen Candidate model and in the Downsian model, but not in the Transaction Cost model. In the Patronage
model, voter preferences matter only when elections are competitive. In view of this, we focus our empirical investigation on the
political color of the ruling majority and on the preferences of the voters, as captured by the vote share of parties to the right. In
contrast to the traditional approach which uses a large battery of explanatory variables to compare different theories, we are able
to assess the four leading theories in a simple empirical framework based on their ability to capture the increase and variation in
outsourcing in Swedish municipalities.
For several reasons, Swedish municipalities provide a suitable testing ground for the models that we have described. Firstly,
we have data in which government outsourcing varies between publicly financed services and between municipalities, as well as
over time. The data contain information on the outsourcing shares of several services in 290 municipalities from 1998 to 2006.
This is a considerable improvement compared with previous studies, which have either lacked the time dimension or have been
limited to a single service (e.g., garbage collection).3
Secondly, Sweden has witnessed an ideological realignment in which the number of municipalities governed by right parties
has increased considerably since around 1990. It is quite suggestive that this trend coincides with a steady increase in local
government outsourcing. The Transaction Cost model predicts that outsourcing will differ between services rather than between
municipalities or over time. Thus, the Transaction Cost model can neither account for the observed general increase in
outsourcing nor for the fact that outsourcing varies widely between municipalities.4
Thirdly, we are able to compare the models by using a difference-in-differences strategy, making use of both similarities and
differences between preschools and primary schools. This approach allows us to address selection problems that arise when political
preferences are correlated with unobserved determinants of outsourcing. Preschools and primary schools are similar services when
it comes to contracting difficulties and local market conditions, making it reasonable that unobserved determinants influence
outsourcing of both services similarly. Moreover, the legislative treatment of these two services has differed in one important respect.
The provision of preschools was fully determined bymunicipal discretion between 1992 and 2006. During the same period, a voucher
system effectively limited the influence of local politicians on the choice between public and private primary schools. Since 1992, a
municipality has to finance private schools that meet national requirements and attract pupils. This gives the ruling majority better
possibilities to influence the outsourcing of preschools, whereas the preferences of the electorate have a direct and relatively larger
influence on the private provision of primary schools. We test how the political color of the local majority and the outsourcing
preferences of the electorate influence differences in outsourcing between preschools and primary schools.
Previous empirical studies have arrived at varying conclusions. Based on a literature review and meta-regressions, Bel and
Fageda (2007, 2009) conclude that a general explanation of local government outsourcing has been hard to find. Still, pragmatic
cost considerations seem to be more important than ideological motivations. If anywhere, ideology seems to matter in Europe and
in large cities. Studies that report that political preferences are unrelated to outsourcing include Christoffersen and Paldam
(2003), Dijkgraaf et al. (2003), McGuire et al. (1987), and Zullo (2009); they incorporate various services in Denmark, the
Netherlands, and the United States. On the other hand, Bhatti et al. (2009) report that Danish municipalities with a conservative
or liberal majority rely more on outsourcing than municipalities with a left majority. Merzyn and Ursprung (2005) study voting
behavior and find that both income and ideology determine the support for education vouchers and subsidies to private schools
in Switzerland. Lopez-de-Silanes et al. (1997) find that the Patronage model explains outsourcing in U.S. counties. Brown and
Potoski (2003) and Levin and Tadelis (2010), instead, present evidence from local governments in the United States that supports
the Transaction Cost model of public sector outsourcing. Ohlsson (2003) finds that cost differences did not affect outsourcing
decisions of refuse collection in Swedish municipalities, suggesting that policy makers did not minimize costs.
We find that the political color of the ruling majority influences the choice between outsourcing and in-house production in
Swedish municipalities. This finding appears both as a general visual pattern in our data and in econometric tests where we2 The Patronage model of government outsourcing is similar to the theory developed by Boycko et al. (1996) on the privatization of state-owned enterprises,
c.f. Bjørnskov and Potrafke (2011) for an empirical account of this kind of privatization with the focus on government ideology.
3 Using cost shares of outsourcing is also an improvement compared with the discrete choice framework in most of the studies in the literature. For
example Brown and Potoski (2003) and Levin and Tadelis (2010) both use dummy dependent variables for mode of production (partly or fully contracted out).
4 Because the savings from outsourcing seem to be quite large when the public sector is ﬁrst opened up for competition (Andersson and Jordahl, 2011), the fact
that many municipalities produce several services fully in-house is another shortcoming of the Transaction Cost model.
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primary schools. The presented evidence is consistent with the Citizen Candidate model of representative democracy. Other
economic and political models (the Transaction Cost, the Patronage, and the Downsian model) fail to capture the development of
outsourcing in the Swedish public sector.
We proceedwith a description of the relevant institutional details in Section 2 and of our data in Section 3. In Section 4we introduce
our econometric approach and conduct a descriptive analysis. Section 5 contains the empirical results and Section 6 our conclusions.
2. Institutional details
Sweden is a welfare state characterized by high taxes, generous benefits, and a large public sector. The public sector is
organized into three levels: municipalities, counties and the national level. The 290 municipalities are entrusted with a
constitutional right of self-governance, including levying income taxes and deciding on local public spending. The municipalities
are required by legislation to provide childcare and early childhood education, primary and secondary education, elderly care, and
a few other services. Health care is mainly provided at county level. In 2006, total municipal expenditure made up 29% of total
public sector expenditure and 15% of GDP. A large share of the total costs of the municipalities (69%) is made up by the three
services, elderly care (30%), primary and secondary education (26%), and preschools (13%).
For our purposes, it is important that municipalities are, in general, free to decide whether they should produce a service
in-house using municipal employees or provide the service through outside contractors. For primary education, however, the
share of pupils in private schools is determined within a national system of school vouchers. Swedish pupils can choose freely
between public and private schools within their municipality, and there is free entry for private providers that meet national
requirements. Between 1992 and 2006, with regard to preschools, the municipalities were free to decide between in-house
production and contracting out. Thereafter, the system has been similar to that of primary education with free entry for private
providers. Since we are making use of the institutional difference between preschools and primary schools between 1992 and
2006, we will briefly describe the rules and regulations governing these two municipal services. Importantly, in 1992 the
government introduced national reforms both of primary schools and of preschools (as we will describe in Sections 2.1 and 2.2).
Both of these national reforms are predetermined and can be seen as exogenous to our study of municipal variation in the period
1998–2006. Table A1 in Appendix A lists the major reforms of preschools and primary schools in Sweden between 1992 and
2006.
2.1. Primary schools
Before 1992, pupils had to attend the public school in their local area. In 1992, a school voucher reform was implemented that
allowed parents and pupils to choose a private school and required the municipalities to pay private schools for each pupil at a
rate corresponding to 85% of the average expenditure in the public schools in the samemunicipality. All schools have to follow the
national curriculum, and the guiding principle behind the reform is that public and private schools should compete on equal
terms. The private schools are not allowed to charge fees (including top-up fees) or to select pupils by ability, socio-economic
characteristics or ethnicity.5 The proportion of pupils in private schools has grown steadily since 1992. In 2006, 8% of all pupils in
primary education (and 15% of all pupils in secondary education) were enrolled in private schools (Statistics Sweden, 2007: 76).
The urbanized areas of south and middle Sweden (the Greater Stockholm area in particular) have the highest concentration of
pupils in private schools.
2.2. Preschools
The municipalities are also legally required to provide preschools and school-age childcare for children between the ages of 1
and 12, allowing parents to work or study. In 2006, 79% of children between the ages of 1 and 5 were enrolled in municipally
financed preschools: 83% in municipal and 17% in private units. There were private preschools in 80% of the municipalities. The
most popular forms of private preschools are for-profit companies and parent cooperatives (with 37 and 32% of the children in
non-municipal preschools respectively).6
Preschools are heavily subsidized by the municipalities and since the 1980s, the subsidies have been made more accessible to
private providers.7 This stepwise process started in 1984 when parent cooperatives and day-care centers with special forms of
pedagogy were allowed to receive public subsidies. Subsidies to for-profit companies were introduced in 1992. Until 2006, the
municipalities made discretionary decisions in each individual case, but since 2006, they have had to grant subsidies to
non-municipal preschools and leisure centers that meet national standards. This means that since 2006, there are no major
differences in the legislative conditions for outsourcing preschools and primary schools.5 See Böhlmark and Lindahl (2012) for a description of the 1992 reform.
6 Swedish National Agency for Education, www.skolverket.se, tables accessed June 17, 2011.
7 As noted by Bergstrom and Blomquist (1996), childcare subsidies induce labor market participation and are therefore more attractive to voters in countries
with high tax rates on labor income.
Table 1
Coalitions in Swedish municipalities 1994–2006.
Election period Left bloc Right bloc Undefined (Greens holding balance)
1994–1998 144 65 78 (30)
1998–2002 112 93 82 (20)
2002–2006 108 98 81 (19)
Notes: When either of the blocs receives more than 50% of the seats, the majority coalition is classified accordingly. When neither of the blocs receives 50% of the
seats, the majority coalition is classified as undefined. Cases when either of the blocs would need the support of the Green Party to form a majority are in
parentheses in the last column.
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the responsibility of preschools was transferred to the Ministry of Education. The change made preschools even more similar to
primary schools. In 2002, a price cap for parents' fees was introduced. Since the cap made no difference between public and
private preschools it has no effect on our empirical investigation.
2.3. Local politics in Sweden
Politically, Sweden is often treated as a fairly stable two-bloc system even though the electoral system is proportional.8 The left
bloc includes the Left Party and the Social Democratic Party. The right bloc includes the Moderate Party, the Center Party, the Liberal
Party, and the Christian Democrats. The Green Party has mostly been positioned outside of the two blocs. Elections are held every
fourth year and the election day is fixed to the third Sunday of September. During our sample period, elections were held in 1998,
2002 and 2006. There is no minimum threshold for winning seats in the municipal councils and a number of small local parties are
represented in someof themunicipal councilswithout holding seats in parliament.9When a small local party or theGreen Party holds
the balance of power in amunicipality, it is difficult to classify themajority as either left or right andwe treat such cases as undefined.
Table 1 gives the frequency of different types of coalitions in the municipalities from 1994 to 2006.
The classification of Swedish parties – and their voters – as either left or right, reflects an ideological divide which is clearly
discernible in opinions on privatization and municipal outsourcing.10 Survey data from the SOM Institute demonstrate that in every
single year during our period of study (1998–2006), citizens who support parties in the right bloc are much more in favor of further
outsourcing education, elderly care and health care than citizens who support parties in the left bloc.11 The supporters of the
Moderate Party are themost positive toward outsourcing and the supporters of the Left Party are themost negative.Within the right
bloc, the supporters of the Center Party do not express as strong a support for outsourcing as the supporters of the other three parties;
still Center Party supporters consistently surpass left bloc supporters in their approval of public sector outsourcing.12
3. Data
We have assembled a new data set from Statistics Sweden in which we observe the outsourcing of several different services in
each of Sweden's 290 municipalities over a nine year period (1998–2006). We exclude two municipalities which were founded
during our sample period (Nykvarn and Knivsta), and one municipality (Upplands Väsby) for which the outsourcing data is
incomplete. This leaves uswith 287municipalities to be used in the further investigation. Our data distinguishes betweenoutsourcing
to private firms, to non-profit organizations and to other units in the public sector. Over the considered period, outsourcingmade up
13% of the cost of public services in the average Swedish municipality (of which outsourcing to other public entities constitutes 45%,
and outsourcing to private firms and to non-profit associations constitutes 35 and 10% respectively).
In our empirical analysis, we also include a group of economic and demographic control variables that may determine
outsourcing.13 Tables C1 and C2 in Appendix C contain definitions and summary statistics of the variables.
4. Econometric approach and descriptive analysis
In Section 4.1, we first describe our econometric approach for studying how government outsourcing is influenced by the
political color of the ruling majority and by the preferences of the voters. In Section 4.2, we then present descriptive results
suggesting that outsourcing is politically determined.8 Sweden is typically classiﬁed as a two-bloc, or bipartisan, system; see e.g. Alesina et al. (1997), Elinder (2010), and Pettersson-Lidbom (2008).
9 At the national level there is a 4% threshold for winning seats in parliament.
10 On the general usefulness of left–right terminology, see Bobbio (1996) and Mair (2007).
11 Party support is measured annually by the question “Which party do you like best today?”
12 The annual SOM surveys are made in the form of a repeated cross-section with a sample representative of the Swedish population. The surveys are available
at The Swedish National Data Service (SND). The data in the SOM surveys were originally collected in a research project at the University of Gothenburg, under
the guidance of Sören Holmberg, Lennart Weibull, and Lennart Nilsson. Neither SND nor the primary researchers are responsible for the analyses and
interpretations presented in this paper. The details of our analyses of the SOM surveys are available upon request.
13 See e.g. Poutvaara and Wagener (2008) for ﬁscal aspects of public sector outsourcing and Borck and Wrohlich (2011) for a link between income and
outsourcing of childcare.
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We relate the measures of outsourcing to two political variables that should capture the influence of political parties and the
preferences for outsourcing among the voters: a dummy for right bloc majorities in the municipal council (Right)14 and the vote
share of right bloc parties within themunicipality in the county election (Votes).15 There are two advantages of using vote shares in
county elections, rather than vote shares in municipal elections, as a measure of the electorates' preferences for outsourcing:
outsourcing is a dominant issue in county elections and strategic behavior by municipal politicians does not affect county election
outcomes.
The first advantage, of using county election results to measure outsourcing preferences, is that outsourcing of health care has
long since been a dominant issue in county politics, while municipal politics is more multidimensional. Health care amounts to
91% of total public expenditure at the county level (Statistics Sweden, 2008). Importantly, according to each of the yearly SOM
surveys, preferences for outsourcing health care is strongly correlated with, and thus a good predictor for, preferences for
outsourcing the municipal services of education and elderly care.16 The election year SOM surveys also show that people who
voted for any of the right bloc parties are considerably more likely to support further outsourcing of health care, education and
elderly care than people who voted for a left bloc party. People who voted for a right bloc party in the county elections are also
somewhat more likely to support the outsourcing of health care and education than people who voted for a right bloc party in
the municipal elections, suggesting that county elections are preferable to municipal elections when measuring outsourcing
preferences.17
The second argument for using voting in county elections as a measure of political preferences is that county elections are not
confounded by strategic behavior of the political parties at the municipal level. As an example of this problem, the Downsian
model of electoral competition predicts policy platforms to converge at the ideal point of the median voter. This results in close
municipal elections, and hence election results that are not very informative about voter preferences. Although the Downsian
model predicts county elections to be close too, the model does not say anything about the distribution of votes within single
municipalities.18
There is a risk of obtaining biased estimates when regressing outsourcing shares on political variables. For instance, the
transaction costs of outsourcing can arguably be lower in municipalities with many small business owners and a large private
sector. Because businessmen and private sector employees are typically more likely to vote for a right party, we run the risk
of falsely concluding that outsourcing, motivated by transaction costs, depends on political preferences. The optimal mix of
public and private production could also differ between municipalities depending on their size, the composition of their
population, and other variables that may be correlated with political preferences; if omitted, such variables will confound our
estimates.
The traditional solution to the described selection problem is to add controls for all potentially confounding variables.
However, doing so is far from easy; data is not available for all variables and it is difficult to know how to correctly specify the
model. We address the problem by using a difference-in-differences strategy that relies on the institutional differences between
preschools and primary schools. Importantly, preschools and primary schools are similar services when it comes to contracting
difficulties and local market conditions. A common element is that quality is difficult to observe and verify; both since parents are
absent and since many of the effects of the service are observed later in life. The pedagogical staff at Swedish preschools and
primary schools have a similar education and follow a national curriculum, and the children experience a smooth transition
between the two stages. The similarities are further demonstrated by the fact that several companies, including the preschool
pioneer Pysslingen, operate both preschools and primary schools.
In particular, we use OLS to estimate different versions of the following general model:14 To a
15 The
16 Wh
(the sur
the corr
surveys
17 The
betwee
18 OnOuti;t;s ¼ α þ βP Righti;t  Pres þ γPVotesi;t  Pres þ βRighti;t þ γ Votesi;t þ Pres þ Xi;tδs þ εi;t;s:
a measure of the degree of outsourcing of preschools and primary schools. Right is a dummy that equals one if the parties inOut is
the right bloc hold a majority of the seats in the municipal council. Votes measures the share of voters in the municipality who
voted for a right bloc party in the county election. Pre is a dummy variable for preschool services. Subscript i, t and s are
municipality, year and service indicators respectively. We have also added the vector X with controls for observable factors that
may determine outsourcing. Note that we allow the influence of these factors to be different for the outsourcing of preschools and
primary schools. Finally, ε is an error term.ccount for the budget process, values of Right in year t are matched with other variables in year t+1.
correlation between Right and Votes is 0.63.
en measuring opinions on outsourcing on a 1–5 scale where 1 is a “Very good suggestion” and 5 is a “Very bad suggestion”, the 1998–2003 SOM surveys
veys in which those questions were asked to all respondents) show that the correlation coefﬁcient between health care and education is 0.55–0.69 and
elation coefﬁcient between health care and elderly care is 0.71–0.80. There are no questions about the outsourcing of preschools or childcare in the SOM
.
share of right party voters who reported that outsourcing is a “Very good suggestion” or a “Rather good suggestion” differs by about one percentage point
n the county and the municipal elections.
average each county consists of 13.8 municipalities.
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primary schools under the same legal framework, we obtain unbiased estimates of the effect of our political variables on outsourcing
preschools relative to primary schools (βP and γP); at least conditional on the control function Xi,tδs. This approach accounts for
unobservables that varywithinmunicipalities over time (due to, for example, localmarket development or learning effects) as long as
the influence of these factors is the same for preschools and primary schools.We can account for differences in contractingpossibilities
between services over time, as long as they are equal for all municipalities, by adding year-service fixed effects to our model. It could
still be the case that the relative contracting possibilities for preschools and primary schools differ geographically. However, even if we
fail to capture such differences with our control variables, we can account for them by adding county-service fixed effects.
Importantly, βP>0 is a distinguishing prediction of the Citizen Candidate model of Besley and Coate (1997) and Osborne and
Slivinski (1996). This prediction follows as the model has two candidates at equidistant points from the median voter's preferred
position running for office (one of whomwill win the election) and as politicians from parties to the right typically have a preference
for more outsourcing than left politicians. The other economic and political models (the Transaction Cost, the Patronage, and the
Downsian model) either explicitly or implicitly predict βP=0. The Transaction Cost model explains outsourcing by the contracting
difficulties of different services. As policy makers maximize social welfare, political parties do not matter. The Downsian model
predicts policy convergence even if the competing politicians prefer different policies. We expect βP=0 in the Patronage model too
since all parties, independently of their political color, prefer in-house production to outsourcing.
The fourmodels also differ with respect to the influence of voter preferences on outsourcing. The estimate of γP is difficult to predict
in the Citizen Candidate model and in the Downsian model. The reason is that we expect a positive effect of the right vote share for
preschools (for which outsourcing is decided by politicians) and for primary schools (from the expectation that right voters are more
inclined to choose a private school for their children). However, the two effects may not be equally large and the difference between
them (γP) is ambiguous, but arguably close to zero.19 In the Transaction Cost model only the latter effect is present (since politicians
only care about economic efficiency) andwe expect γPb0. According to the Patronagemodel politicians prefer public employment and
will choose lower levels of outsourcing than voters prefer. However, this differencewill be smaller in competitive elections as politicians
then need to accommodate voter preferences in order to be reelected. The Patronagemodel thus predicts that that γP is negative when
elections are non-competitive (analogous to the Transaction Costmodel) and ambiguouswhen elections are competitive (analogous to
the Citizen Candidate and Downsian models). We briefly describe the four models and their parameter predictions in Table 2.
4.2. Descriptive analysis
It is problematic to explain public sector outsourcing by economic efficiency. If transaction costs determine outsourcing,
service characteristics should be decisive and we should observe little variation between municipalities and over time. However,
our data show that outsourcing, as a share of the costs of municipal services, has increased by 30% from 1998 to 2006. While such
a trend toward more outsourcing in the public sector does not necessarily contradict the Transaction Cost model (it is perhaps in
line with the growth of outsourcing in the business sector), there are several public services – including preschools and primary
schools – for which a substantial reduction of transaction costs seems unlikely. It is rather suggestive that the trend toward more
outsourcing coincides with a political realignment in the municipalities. As described in Section 2.3, the right bloc had a majority
in 65 municipalities after the 1994 election. After the 2002 election, this number had increased to 98. Fig. 1 displays the coinciding
increase in outsourcing and the rise of right bloc majorities in the municipal councils.
Looking at the cross-section, the use of outsourcing differs considerably between municipalities. While the Transaction Cost model
cannot account for this, the differences seem to follow a political pattern. The boxplots in Fig. 2 summarize outsourcing in Swedish
municipalities in 2006. It is evident that municipalities with right blocmajorities are outsourcingmore thanmunicipalities with left bloc
majorities. The large spread among right municipalities is another notable difference. On the one hand, several right municipalities
produce all or almost all of the depicted services themselves. On the other hand, all of the observations with extremely high values of
outsourcing are right municipalities. Finally, an unmistakable difference between preschools and primary schools is that the
municipalities are more dispersed for preschools with several very high values of outsourcing in right municipalities, whereas the
maximum levels for primary schools aremore similar in left and rightmunicipalities. Fig. 2 also contains boxplots for elderly care,which –
like preschools – is a service over whichmunicipalities had discretionary outsourcing control. Because the outsourcing of preschools and
elderly care (but not of primary schools) varies considerably depending on politicalmajority, it seems likely that the political preferences
of the majority coalition influence outsourcing —when national legislation allows for this.
The time series of outsourcing in municipalities with different political majorities provide additional pieces of information.
Fig. 3 plots the outsourcing patterns of preschools and primary schools between 1998 and 2006 in four types of municipalities.
Taken together, these four graphs also suggest that political preferences influence the outsourcing of preschools, the service that
municipalities were free to decide on. Firstly, note that the pattern of primary school outsourcing is very similar in all four groups
of municipalities, demonstrating the lack of political influence on this service. Secondly, the difference between outsourcing
preschools in municipalities with left and right majorities (the two upper graphs) suggests that right majorities are more prone
to use outsourcing. Thirdly, the slope of preschool outsourcing falls over time in municipalities with a leftward shift of majority
(the lower left graph), but increases in municipalities with a rightward shift of majority (the lower right graph).19 The positive association between support for right bloc parties and support for the further outsourcing of education (which we reported in Section 2.3) does
not differ much between parents and non-parents. In addition, an opinion survey conducted by Demoskop in 2001 reported that 35% of parents with children in a
private school would vote for one of the right bloc parties, compared to only 24% of parents with children in a public school (Bergmark, 2001).
Table 2
Model predictions.
Model Description βP γP
Citizen candidate Policy motivation and policy divergence >0 ≈0
Transaction cost Service specific contracting difficulty
determines outsourcing
0 b0
Patronage (non-competitive) All politicians prefer in-house production 0 b0
Patronage (competitive) Need to accommodate voter preferences 0 ≈0
Downs Median voter decisive 0 ≈0
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1st quartile, 3rd quartile, and outliers.
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Fig. 3. Development of outsourcing in municipalities with different political majorities. Notes: Costs of outsourcing to all providers as a share of the total costs of
the service. A leftward shift means that the majority in the municipality has changed from right to left, from right to undefined, or from undefined to left in the
2002 election. Correspondingly, a rightward shift means a change from left to right, from left to undefined, or from undefined to right in the 2002 election.
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explanations. Next we move on to our econometric analysis which allows us to address several methodological difficulties.
5. Results
In this section, we present the estimates of our empirical model. Table 3 contains the estimated parameters, with outsourcing
to all providers as the dependent variable. The specifications in columns 1–4 differ according to whether we include interactions
between the economic and demographic control variables and the preschool dummy, and year and county fixed effects
(all interacted with the preschool dummy). In general, specifications with interactions providemore reliable results since they are
more flexible and rely on weaker assumptions. Column 5 presents results from a specification that makes a distinction between
more and less competitive elections. Detailed regression results (including all estimates for control variables and interaction
terms) are presented in Table B1 in Appendix B and description of variables in Appendix C.
Comparing columns 1 and 2 in Table 3,we see that the coefficient for Right×Pre (βP) increases and becomes statistically significant
when Pre is interacted with the control variables. As we show in Table B1 in Appendix B, this is due to the interactions including the
two demographic variables Preschool children and School children (which capture the share of the population in preschool age and
school age). Adding additional interaction terms changes themain coefficients of interest only moderately. That the share of children
in preschool age ismore important for the outsourcing of preschools and that the share of children in school age ismore important for
the outsourcing of primary schools is intuitive and something that the specification should allow for.
The positive coefficient for Right×Pre (βP) implies that municipalities with a right majority are outsourcing relatively more
preschools than primary schools when compared to municipalities with a left or undefined majority. The size of the effect is
economically significant. Given the ideological preferences of the electorate, the average right government is outsourcing about
1.5 percentage points more of preschools than of primary schools (the average outsourcing share over the period is 7.1 both for
preschools and primary schools).
Note that the estimated effects are for a right majority relative to a left or an undefined majority. The choice to look at right
majorities vs. left and undefined majorities, rather than at left vs. right and undefined, is largely arbitrary. Results for the latter
specification are presented in Appendix B, Table B2, and are consistent with the results presented in Table 3.
The other coefficient of interest, for Votes×Pre (γP), is also positive and statistically significant in all but column 2. However,
the effect of voter preferences on outsourcing appears quite weak. A ten percentage point gain in the vote share for the parties in
the right bloc – i.e. a very large rise – increases the outsourcing of preschools relative to primary schools by at most 0.9 percentage
points, according to our estimates.
Table 3
Estimates of outsourcing of preschools and primary schools.
Dep. var: outsourcing (all providers, share of costs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Right×Pre (βP) 0.398 1.603*** 1.581*** 1.429*** 1.458***
(0.368) (0.374) (0.369) (0.359) (0.365)
Votes×Pre (γP) 0.210*** 0.023 0.056** 0.087*** 0.092***
(0.020) (0.022) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026)
Pre −9.246*** −45.44*** −42.38*** −39.63*** −39.33***
(0.796) (7.655) (7.485) (8.566) (8.569)
Right 0.990*** 0.388* 0.388* 0.112 0.099
(0.241) (0.234) (0.234) (0.237) (0.237)
Votes −0.068*** 0.025** 0.032** 0.001 −0.006
(0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
Votes×Pre×Competitive −0.057
(0.046)
Votes×Competitive 0.081***
(0.028)
Competitive×Pre 2.411
(2.229)
Competitive −3.607***
(1.367)
Constant −2.978* 4.891 5.985 12.02** 11.13**
(1.661) (4.670) (4.764) (5.384) (5.372)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls×Pre Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects×Pre Yes Yes Yes
County fixed effects Yes Yes
County fixed effects×Pre Yes Yes
Observations 5128 5128 5128 5128 5128
Municipalities 287 287 287 287 287
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** pb0.01, ** pb0.05, * pb0.1.
51M. Elinder, H. Jordahl / European Journal of Political Economy 30 (2013) 43–57The specification in column 5 investigates whether or not the relationship between votes and outsourcing differs between
competitive and non-competitive elections, as suggested by the Patronage model. We identify competitive elections as elections
in which the right bloc obtains between 45 and 55% of the votes; when this is the case, we set the dummy Competitive equal to
one. Again, note that we measure voters' preferences for outsourcing by the vote share for the right bloc within a municipality in
the county election; whereas we measure competitiveness by the vote share in the municipal election.
In the specification in column 5, we include the dummy Competitive, an interaction between Competitive and right votes in the
county election (Votes), an interaction between Competitive and the preschool dummy (Pre), and, finally, the interaction between
all three variables. The Patronage model predicts the parameter of the triple interaction to be negative, as the voters' preferences
for outsourcing should only influence outsourcing for preschools when elections are close. The estimates in column 5 do not
indicate that patronage is more widespread in non-competitive elections.20
All of the specifications in Table 3 are linear, which could be problematic since our dependent variable is bounded between
zero and 100. First, predictions for the dependent variable may be out of the feasible range for large values of the explanatory
variables. It turns out that our model predicts no values above 100% and very few below zero (it does so for 2.5% of the
observations, and none of these predictions fall below−3%). Second, a linear model might produce misleading estimates of the
effects, in particular for extreme values of the explanatory variables. These problems are, however, not immediate in our setting
since both explanatory variables that we focus on are also bounded (Right is a dummy and Votes is bounded between zero and
100). To address such issues of non-linearities, we have estimated the specification in column 4 when excluding observations in
the tails of the distribution of Votes. Since our coefficients of interest are relatively stable when we do this (see Table B3 in
Appendix B for results from nine different exclusions) we believe that our linear estimates are informative of the relevant
effects.
Finally, it is possible that outsourcing to private and public providers has different explanations. Table 4 contains estimates
from specifications where the dependent variable is outsourcing to private providers. The estimates are smaller both for
Right×Pre (βP) and for Votes×Pre (γP), but choices of private outsourcing do not seem to differ markedly from outsourcing
choices within the public sector. Municipalities with a right bloc majority use both public and private providers to outsource
relatively more preschools than primary schools, compared to left or undefined majorities.20 We have also tested for different effects of Votes above and below the 50% threshold in competitive elections. This test gives no support for the Patronage
model either.
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Traditional explanations of public sector outsourcing have mainly focused on contracting difficulties and transaction costs. The
few papers that have tested for political explanations have either focused on the Patronagemodel or failed to connect their results
to specific political theories.
In this paper, we have tested for political explanations of outsourcing by making use of a new data set containing detailed
information on outsourcing in Swedish municipalities. We find that right governments are more prone to use outsourcing to
provide publicly financed services than left governments. This is consistent with the political view of government outsourcing in
the Citizen Candidate model of Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997), in which politicians are motivated by
the chance to implement their own preferred policy.
Other political models (the Patronage model and the Downsian model) fail to capture the development of outsourcing in the
Swedish public sector. The Downsian model explicitly predicts that there should be no difference in outsourcing between left and
right governments, whereas the Patronagemodel does not give any comparable prediction. The Patronagemodel predicts that voters'
preferences will have a larger influence on outsourcing in close elections, a prediction which our data do not support. Given its
prominence among economists, most notable is the inability of the Transactions Cost model to explain the outsourcing pattern in
Swedishmunicipalities. Both our descriptive and our econometric evidence speak against the relevance of the Transaction Costmodel.
Our result stands in contrast to previous studies in other countries, which have mostly concluded that political preferences are
unrelated to outsourcing. We conclude that the political preferences of the ruling majority appear to be important in explaining
public sector outsourcing. The related question of whether outsourcing affects electoral outcomes and whether it does so
differently for the left and for the right is left for future research.Acknowledgments
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Estimates of outsourcing of preschools and primary schools to private providers.
Dep. Var: outsourcing (private providers, share of costs)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Right×Pre (βP) 0.615** 0.617** 0.572** 0.728***
(0.289) (0.274) (0.278) (0.281)
Votes×Pre (γP) 0.003 0.043** 0.050** 0.058**
(0.017) (0.019) (0.022) (0.023)
Pre −26.95*** −22.03*** −27.29*** −24.83***
(6.426) (6.025) (6.997) (6.926)
Right 0.297 0.301* 0.099 0.134
(0.184) (0.182) (0.184) (0.187)
Votes 0.016* 0.021** 0.015 0.010
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012)
Votes×Pre×Competitive −0.054
(0.037)
Votes×Competitive 0.061**
(0.026)
Competitive×Pre 1.360
(1.769)
Competitive −3.050**
(1.252)
Constant −0.941 0.071 7.511* 8.071*
(3.496) (3.514) (4.198) (4.203)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls×Pre Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects×Pre Yes Yes Yes
County fixed effects Yes Yes
County fixed effects×Pre Yes Yes
Observations 5120 5120 5120 5120
Municipalities 287 287 287 287
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** pb0.01, ** pb0.05, * pb0.1. Detailed regression results (including all estimates for control variables and interaction terms)
are presented in Table B4 in Appendix B.
Table A1
Major reforms of preschools and primary schools in Sweden 1992–2006.
Reform Year Description Comment
Subsidies to for-profit preschools 1992 Subsidies to for-profit preschools
are legalized.
A voucher system with freedom of entry is
part of the reform, but is not implemented
(by the left government taking office in 1994).
School voucher system 1992 Free entry of private for-profit and
non-profit primary schools that meet
national requirements; pupils are
free to choose between schools;
municipalities pay private schools
for each pupil.
Limits the influence of municipalities on the
private provision of primary education.
National curriculum for preschools 1998 Pedagogical content strengthened
through national curriculum; preschools
handled by the Ministry of Education.
Preschools become even more similar to
primary schools.
Fee reform for preschools 2002 A price cap for parents' fees is introduced. No difference between public and private
preschools; no effect on our empirical investigation.
Preschool voucher system 2006 Freedom of entry and freedom of choice
similar to the school voucher system.
Removes the difference between the
municipalities' ability to outsource preschools
and primary schools.
Table B1
Detailed estimates of outsourcing of primary schools and preschools.
Dep. var: outsourcing (all providers, cost share) (1) (1′) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Right×Pre (βP) 0.398 1.291*** 1.603*** 1.581*** 1.429*** 1.458***
(0.368) (0.378) (0.374) (0.369) (0.359) (0.365)
Votes×Pre 0.210*** 0.131*** 0.023 0.056** 0.087*** 0.092***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026)
Pre −9.246*** −11.089*** −45.437*** −42.384*** −39.625*** −39.332***
(0.796) (1.751) (7.655) (7.485) (8.566) (8.569)
Right 0.990*** 0.543** 0.388* 0.388* 0.112 0.099
(0.241) (0.242) (0.234) (0.234) (0.237) (0.237)
Votes −0.068*** −0.028** 0.025** 0.032** 0.001 −0.006
(0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
Votes×Pre×Competitive −0.057
(0.046)
Votes×Competitive 0.081***
(0.028)
Competitive×Pre 2.411
(2.229)
Competitive −3.607***
(1.367)
Employment −0.234*** −0.234*** −0.229*** −0.247*** −0.279*** −0.287***
(0.051) (0.050) (0.059) (0.062) (0.068) (0.068)
Business employment 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.053*** 0.059*** 0.070*** 0.070***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Tax base 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.093*** 0.121*** 0.029 0.033*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019)
Municipal net profit/loss −4.81e−6 −4.81e−6 1.33e−5 2.07e−5 2.46e−5 2.59e−5
(3.42e−5) (3.41e−5) (4.26e−5) (4.29e−5) (3.50e−5) (3.46e−5)
Grants 0.000168*** 0.000168*** 0.000277*** 0.000354*** 0.000294*** 0.000296***
(3.09e−5) (3.07e−5) (3.21e−5) (4.23e−5) (5.69e−5) (5.66e−5)
University education (3≥years) 0.737*** 0.737*** 0.305*** 0.261*** 0.434*** 0.431***
(0.054) (0.053) (0.060) (0.066) (0.064) (0.065)
Preschool children (b7 years, percent) 0.949*** −0.048 −0.112 −0.264 −0.611*** −0.614***
(0.137) (0.134) (0.146) (0.191) (0.192) (0.193)
School children (7 to 16, percent) 0.309*** 0.660*** −0.032 −0.105 0.087 0.101
(0.109) (0.133) (0.126) (0.143) (0.131) (0.130)
Old (≥65 years) 0.074 0.074 −0.285*** −0.366*** −0.265*** −0.260***
(0.066) (0.065) (0.076) (0.083) (0.089) (0.089)
Foreign citizens 0.064** 0.064** 0.050 0.032 −0.104*** −0.102**
(0.028) (0.028) (0.038) (0.038) (0.040) (0.040)
On welfare 0.185*** 0.185*** −0.022 −0.058 −0.258*** −0.254***
(0.065) (0.063) (0.081) (0.082) (0.085) (0.085)
(continued on next page)
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Table B1 (continued)
Dep. var: outsourcing (all providers, cost share) (1) (1′) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Interactions with preschool dummy
Employment −0.010 −0.075 0.044 0.050
(0.098) (0.105) (0.122) (0.122)
Business employment 0.050** 0.066*** 0.056** 0.057**
(0.022) (0.024) (0.026) (0.027)
Tax base −0.022 0.078** 0.045 0.041
(0.016) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038)
Municipal profit/loss −3.62e−5 −8.99e−6 −4.29e−5 −4.38e−5
(6.73e−5) (6.71e−5) (6.13e−5) (6.11e−5)
Grants −0.000217*** 6.15e−5 −0.000175* −0.000175***
(6.02e−5) (7.25e−5) (9.60e−5) (9.59e−5)
University education (3≥years) 0.864*** 0.628*** 0.517*** 0.524***
(0.101) (0.100) (0.103) (0.104)
Preschool children (b7 years, percent) 1.994*** 2.122*** 2.112*** 2.038*** 2.033***
(0.170) (0.259) (0.320) (0.322) (0.323)
School children (7 to 16, percent) −0.703*** 0.682*** 0.113 0.215 0.201
(0.133) (0.210) (0.221) (0.217) (0.215)
Old (≥65 years) 0.718*** 0.472*** 0.650*** 0.640***
(0.128) (0.125) (0.137) (0.138)
Foreign citizens 0.028 −0.061 −0.056 −0.060
(0.055) (0.057) (0.071) (0.072)
On welfare 0.414*** 0.334*** 0.491*** 0.483***
(0.123) (0.122) (0.137) (0.137)
Constant −13.205*** −12.283*** 4.891 5.985 12.02** 11.987**
(3.928) (3.915) (4.670) (4.764) (5.384) (5.407)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects×Pre Yes Yes Yes
County fixed effects Yes Yes
County fixed effects×Pre Yes Yes
Observations 5128 5128 5128 5128 5128 5128
Municipalities 287 287 287 287 287 287
Robust standard errors in parentheses.*** pb0.01, ** pb0.05, * pb0.1.
Table B2
Outsourcing of preschools and primary schools using left majority and preferences.
Dep. var: outsourcing (all providers, share of costs)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Left×Pre (βP) −0.544 −0.663** −0.862*** −1.032***
(0.348) (0.333) (0.332) (0.344)
Votes×Pre (γP) −0.070*** −0.107*** −0.109*** −0.105***
(0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023)
Pre −42.15*** −37.34*** −30.70*** −30.01***
(7.769) (7.530) (8.762) (8.732)
Left −0.442** −0.497** −0.291 −0.213
(0.220) (0.222) (0.218) (0.223)
Votes (for the left bloc) 0.003 −0.001 0.0141 0.017
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Votes×Pre×Competitive −0.031
(0.049)
Votes×Competitive −0.055*
(0.029)
Competitive×Pre 0.896
(2.194)
Competitive 2.674**
(1.297)
Constant 0.280 1.263 9.820* 9.238*
(4.546) (4.619) (5.461) (5.468)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls×Pre Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects×Pre Yes Yes Yes
County fixed effects Yes Yes
County fixed effects×Pre Yes Yes
Observations 5128 5128 5128 5128
Municipalities 287 287 287 287
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** pb0.01, ** pb0.05, * pb0.1.
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Table B3
Robustness with respect to high and low values of Votes.
Sample: (1)
Excl.
top 1%
(2)
Excl.
top 5%
(3)
Excl.
top 10%
(4)
Excl.
bottom 1%
(5)
Excl.
bottom 5%
(6)
Excl.
bottom 10%
(7)
Incl.
mid 95%
(8)
Incl.
mid 90%
(9)
Incl.
mid 50%
Right×Pre 1.274*** 1.398*** 1.169*** 1.330*** 1.166*** 1.135*** 1.327*** 1.092*** 0.934**
(0.365) (0.356) (0.347) (0.361) (0.372) (0.376) (0.356) (0.369) (0.471)
Votes×Pre 0.135*** 0.109*** 0.0729*** 0.0947*** 0.102*** 0.110*** 0.119*** 0.137*** 0.116**
(0.0269) (0.0247) (0.0244) (0.0256) (0.0275) (0.0289) (0.0239) (0.0273) (0.0539)
Pre −43.75*** −42.96*** −29.67*** −39.37*** −30.49*** −26.09*** −40.54*** −32.18*** −17.06
(8.867) (8.875) (8.612) (8.634) (8.927) (9.149) (8.766) (9.168) (12.06)
Right 0.0543 0.0956 −0.140 0.0649 0.207 0.198 −0.0142 0.189 −0.0420
(0.238) (0.240) (0.239) (0.239) (0.243) (0.243) (0.241) (0.248) (0.323)
Votes 0.0191 0.0295* 0.0527*** 0.000334 −0.0127 −0.0161 0.0199 0.0101 0.128***
(0.0152) (0.0166) (0.0173) (0.0147) (0.0157) (0.0166) (0.0161) (0.0184) (0.0382)
Constant 11.16** 12.19** 10.09* 9.631* 8.839 1.847 9.375* 0.229 31.14***
(5.369) (5.374) (5.535) (5.444) (5.517) (5.574) (5.510) (5.759) (8.699)
Controls×Pre Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects×Pre Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County fixed effects×Pre Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5072 4876 4610 5076 4860 4628 4878 4608 2530
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** pb0.01, ** pb0.05, * pb0.1.
Table B4
Detailed estimates of outsourcing of primary schools and preschools to private providers.
Dep. var: outsourcing (private providers, share of costs)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Right×Pre (βP) 0.615** 0.617** 0.572** 0.728***
(0.289) (0.274) (0.278) (0.281)
Votes×Pre 0.00266 0.0433** 0.0503** 0.0576**
(0.0017) (0.019) (0.0217) (0.0228)
Pre −26.95*** −22.03*** −27.29*** −24.83***
(6.426) (6.025) (6.997) (6.926)
Right 0.297 0.301* 0.0994 0.134
(0.184) (0.182) (0.184) (0.187)
Votes 0.0163* 0.0212** 0.0149 0.0103
(0.010) (0.010) (0.0114) (0.0119)
Votes×Pre×Competitive −0.0542
(0.0374)
Votes×Competitive 0.0611**
(0.0260)
Competitive×Pre 1.360
(1.769)
Competitive −3.050**
(1.252)
Employment −0.0928 −0.110 −0.183*** −0.189***
(0.047) (0.049) (0.0564) (0.0564)
Business employment 0.0552** 0.0581*** 0.0748*** 0.0757***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.0116) (0.0117)
Tax base 0.0561*** 0.0718** 0.0156 0.0159
(0.007) (0.014) (0.0146) (0.0144)
Municipal net profit/loss 2.11e−5 2.41e−5 3.28e−5 3.35e−5
(3.54e−5) (3.61e−5) (3.25e−5) (3.24e−5)
Grants 0.000190*** 0.000233*** 0.000128*** 0.000132***
(2.6e−5) (3.25e−5) (4.47e−5) (4.47e−5)
University education (3≥years) 0.106 0.0713 0.134*** 0.140***
(0.043) (0.045) (0.0447) (0.0453)
Preschool children (b7 years, percent) −0.0782 −0.114 −0.289** −0.308**
(0.110) (0.138) (0.147) (0.147)
School children (7 to 16, percent) −0.126 −0.199* −0.165 −0.164
(0.102) (0.113) (0.110) (0.110)
Old (≥65 years) −0.0751 −0.123** −0.116* −0.124*
(0.058) (0.059) (0.0668) (0.0669)
(continued on next page)
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Table B4 (continued)
Dep. var: outsourcing (private providers, share of costs)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Foreign citizens −0.104*** −0.119*** −0.186*** −0.189***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.0305) (0.0306)
On welfare 0.0931 0.0773 −0.0687 −0.0770
(0.061) (0.060) (0.0670) (0.0670)
Interactions with preschool dummy
Employment −0.273* −0.357** −0.223** −0.216**
(0.086) (0.092) (0.106) (0.105)
Business employment 0.048** 0.077*** 0.0861*** 0.0896***
(0.020) (0.022) (0.0260) (0.0260)
Tax base 0.0212 0.173*** 0.118*** 0.107***
(0.014) (0.036) (0.0326) (0.0321)
Municipal profit/loss −3.63e−5 −4.68e−6 −2.14e−5 −2.30e−5
(6.35e−5) (6.28e−5) (5.99e−5) (5.96e−5)
Grants −0.000273*** 0.000145** −4.87e−5 −4.26e−5
(5.19e−5) (5.77e−5) (7.69e−5) (7.71e−5)
University education (3≥years) 0.507*** 0.226*** 0.246*** 0.276***
(0.086) (0.079) (0.0811) (0.0818)
Preschool children (b7 years, percent) 1.712*** 1.172*** 1.276*** 1.225***
(0.213) (0.267) (0.276) (0.273)
School children (7 to 16, percent) 0.490** −0.0704 0.200 0.160
(0.193) (0.194) (0.199) (0.196)
Old (≥65 years) 0.550*** 0.149 0.392*** 0.349***
(0.108) (0.098) (0.114) (0.112)
Foreign citizens 0.148*** 0.0417 0.0359 0.0198
(0.042) (0.041) (0.0483) (0.0493)
On welfare 0.146 −0.0190 0.253** 0.215**
(0.097) (0.089) (0.107) (0.107)
Constant −0.941 0.0713 7.511* 8.071*
(3.496) (3.514) (4.198) (4.203)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects×Pre Yes Yes Yes
County fixed effects Yes Yes
County fixed effects×Pre Yes Yes
Observations 5120 5120 5120 5120
Municipalities 287 287 287 287
R-squared 0.317 0.356 0.394 0.401
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** pb0.01, ** pb0.05, * pb0.1.
Table C1
Definition of variables.
Variable name Definition
Out Outsourcing of preschools or primary schools as share of the total costs for that service. Percent. In the main specifications (Table 3)
it refers to outsourcing to all providers. In Table 4 it refers to outsourcing to private companies.
Right Dummy that equals 1 if the parties in the right bloc hold a majority of the seats in the municipal council.
Votes Votes for the parties in the right bloc within the municipality in the county election. Percent.
Pre Dummy that equals 1 for preschool and zero for primary schools.
Competitive Competitive election. Dummy that equals 1 if the parties in the right bloc obtained 45 to 55% of the votes in the municipal election.
Employment Employed as share of population. Percent.
Business employment Private sector employment as a share of total employment. Percent.
Tax base Taxable labor income. Unit: Thousands of Kronor per capita.
Municipal net profit/loss Municipal net profit. Unit: Kronor per capita.
Grants General and cost equalizing grants from the national government. Unit: Kronor per capita.
University education Share of population with a university degree equivalent to three or more years of study. Percent.
Preschool children Share of population that is six years old or younger. Percent.
School children Share of population that is between seven and sixteen years old. Percent.
Old Share of population that is 65 years or older. Percent.
Foreign citizens Share of population who are not Swedish citizens. Percent.
On welfare Share of population that receives public subsistence support. Percent.
Source: Statistics Sweden.
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Table C2
Summary statistics.
Variable name Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Out: preschool 2582 7.1 7.6 0 78.6
Out: primary school 2582 7.1 4.7 0 33.0
Right 2583 0.32 0.46 0 1
Votes (county) 2583 43.9 11.9 10 85.9
Votes (municipal) 2574 43.5 11.2 9.9 85.4
Competitive 2592 0.29 0.45 0 1
Employment 2574 44.8 3.3 30.7 54.2
Business employment 2583 57.7 9.0 23.7 83.9
Tax base 2574 116 21 74 257
Municipal net profit/loss 2574 399 2273 −12,986 32,358
Grants 2574 7123 4728 −15,521 25,010
University education 2574 6.8 3.4 2.3 25.8
Preschool children 2583 7.3 1.1 4.7 11.8
School children 2583 13.6 1.3 7.3 17.7
Old 2574 19.2 3.6 7.7 30.0
Foreign citizens 2574 4.0 2.7 0.7 29.3
On welfare 2574 3.0 1.2 0 10.4
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